Iranian uranium enrichment facilities that use gas centrifuges have been the main proliferation concern among Western countries for many years.
Uranium Hexafluoride gas is spun in such centrifuges at high speed to separate the uranium u-235 isotope, which is fissile.
Low levels of such enrichment - low-enriched uranium (LEU) - can be used in nuclear power reactors, while highly enriched uranium (HEU) can be used in nuclear weapons.
Nuclear power reactors can be fed with LEU, which contains less than 5% u-235; research reactors use LEU, which contains 20% u-235, and weapons-grade uranium contains 90% u-235.
Tehran maintains that its enrichment program is peaceful, and
meant to produce fuel for nuclear power reactors.
Ever since the US backed out of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the CRS reports that Iran has stopped implementing this agreement and the IAEA monitoring required under the program.
The CRS, quoting the IAEA, reported that the expansion of Iran's enrichment facilities had reduced the time required for it to enrich enough uranium for it to achieve a breakthrough weapons capability.
The aim of the Iranian weapons program, according to US intelligence assessments, is to produce an implosion-type nuclear weapon for use in the Shahab-3 Ballistic Missile, even as intelligence has consistently pointed out that Iran has not mastered all of the technologies that are required in building nuclear weapons.
These JCPOA requirements are in addition to Iran's comprehensive IAEA
safeguards agreement, which authorizes the agency to detect any violations and inspect and keep track of the inventory of certain nuclear materials and certain facilities.
The JCPOA required Iran to cap its enriched stockpiles of uranium at 300 kgs of Uranium Hexafluoride gas containing 3.67% u-235, which corresponds to 202.8 kgs of uranium. At these levels, Iran would have needed to undertake enrichment activities for 10 years, to be one year away from enriching enough HEU for producing one nuclear weapon.
According to the CRS, Iran has now expanded its number of installed centrifuges, as well as the number of enrichment locations, besides conducting further research and development, as well as uranium metal production.
Iran has enough fissile material that, if further
enriched, would be sufficient for several nuclear weapons,
according to U.S. officials.
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley, in early 2023,
testified that Iran could produce this amount of HEU “in
approximately 10-15 days.”
However, Iran still lacks the design and the capability to produce an implosion-style nuclear weapon, with such capability still being months away, even if Iran works on weaponization in tandem with its enrichment efforts.
Therefore, the CRS report underscores that there are two parallel programs at work: enrichment and weaponization.
Also, there is the question of covert installations and activities, which would make all timelines and estimates meaningless.
Analysis
Therefore, the implied message in CRS reports and in Congressional deliberations is to target Iranian enrichment facilities to take out their capacity to enrich uranium to weapons-grade levels.
Also, the West appears to be cognizant of the fact that it cannot be sure, even in the wake of international agreements, about Iranian nuclear covert facilities, activities research, and development, to counter which there appears to be little choice than to have boots on the ground, in Iran.
Whether this follows conventional patterns of occupying forces, or whether this is achieved through proxies.
Additionally, there is the question of where Iran got this gas centrifuge technology and how they upgraded to more modern and efficient centrifuges allowing them to enrich uranium to higher levels of purity.
Thus, Pakistan is once again in the crosshairs of international watchdogs, with persistent allegations of it proliferating technology through the Khan Network.
Deliberations in Western capitals are nudging towards the conclusion that no effective policing of Iran can take place without first policing Pakistan.
While an invasion of Iran may reveal, in time, the scale of the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology, it will still not exonerate Pakistan since pressure will be built on other countries suspected of benefitting from Pakistan's technical know-how, such as North Korea.
In other words, an invasion of Iran will further isolate Pakistan and hasten its dismantling through various international control regimes.
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