China, like the US and Russia, is busy upgrading its nuclear triad, which necessitates reworking its nuclear doctrine, taking into account the nuclear and conventional posture of other superpowers.
As such, it is busy upgrading its missile shield, retiring obsolete missile systems with newer ones that are smarter, networked, and boast better technical and tactical characteristics.
China’s nuclear triad includes:
- Silo-based missile systems
- Ground-based missiles launched from complexes
- Sea-based ballistic missiles
- Cruise missiles carried by strategic bombers.
Other medium—and long-range missiles include the DongFeng-26, the DongFeng-31, and the DongFeng-31B. They vary in range from 2,150 to 11,700 km and carry either a single warhead or MIRVs with an explosive yield of between 90 and 500 kilotons.
The DF-5 intercontinental ballistic missile has a 3-megaton warhead.
At sea, China has deployed the new Type 096 Tang-class submarine. These submarines are stocked with Juylang-3 ballistic missiles with a range of 11,000 km and are capable of carrying six to nine thermonuclear warheads.
In the air, China is preparing to deploy the Xian H-20 strategic bombers that is slated to carry its arsenals of cruise missiles, including the Chang Jian-10A.
These bombers will replace the Xian H-6, which is a license-built variant of the Soviet Tupolev Tu-16 - the bomber used to test-drop China's first nuclear device 60 years ago, and which continues to serve as the mainstay of the aerial portion of its nuclear triad.
China is also working on its hypersonic glide vehicles, looking to stack its missiles with hypersonic warheads, such as the DFZ glide vehicles, which will further require upgrading of its nuclear doctrine.
Since China has a no-first-use policy concerning nuclear weapons, it must rely heavily on missile shields to detect and thwart a first strike directed against it.
Consequently, it is imperative for China to upgrade its missile shield with a new generation of anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs), as well as work out the parameters of a counterstrike, should it come under attack.
It is reasonable to expect that its fast-advancing space program will host a portion of this missile shield, in the form of targeting and positioning systems, while ABMs will need to be deployed throughout its myriad land borders for complete coverage of its territories.
Given that we are now living in the age of the hypersonic nuclear warhead, no corner of China will feel secure from intruding projectiles and glide vehicles, whether sea-based in the Bay of Bengal, or whether such threats emanate from land-based batteries in India.
Therefore, one can expect a portion of China's ballistic missile shield will probably be hosted in Pakistan to provide an added layer of protection to its mainland.
The direction in which Chinese Strategic forces are headed and the goals with which they are aligned, foretell that an early warning and control system in Pakistan will probably be established and networked as a subsystem with its main missile shield shortly.
As such, the Indian misfiring of the BrahMos, a nuclear-capable supersonic cruise missile that "mistakenly" landed in Pakistan after an "error", will perturb the Chinese as they factor in such a dangerous "mishap" into their strategic calculus.
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